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THE VOICE OF A CHILD: INDEPENDENT LEGAL
REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN PRIVATE
CUSTODY DISPUTES WHEN SEXUAL ABUSE
IS ALLEGED
KERIN S. BIsCHOFF-
Children are our most precious resource, and it is fundamental that they have
a chance to be brought up in an environment where they are not abused or
neglected. To that end, it is the duty of our courts to use every available legal
means to see that such a goal be attained.'
Children represent the future of society and the promise of
humankind. Yet children are vulnerable, impressionable, and in
need of guidance. When court proceedings will immutably alter chil-
drens' lives, their interests must be voiced.2
"The right to representation by counsel is not a formality.., i.t
is of the essence ofjustice."' Children are now guaranteed legal rep-
resentation in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Children in state-
initiated investigations of suspected abuse are also provided with
counsel, based on the premise that a child is an independent individ-
ual with the right to articulate her own interests in matters so funda-
mentally affecting the quality of her life.4 When allegations of sexual
abuse occur during a private custody battle, however, independent
representation for the child is not required and is rarely provided.
While some children's rights advocates urge requiring counsel to
t B.S. 1988, Bowling Green State University;J.D. Candidate 1991, University of
Pennsylvania. This Comment is dedicated to Susan Knecht Smith, with many thanks.
I C.J.(S.)R. v. G.D.S., 701 S.W.2d 165, 169-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
2 See generally J. WALLERSTEIN & S. BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN
& CHILDREN A DECADE AFrER DIVORCE (1989) [hereinafter SECOND CHANCES]
(exploring the psychological impact of divorce on children); Foster & Freed, A Bill of
Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343 (1972) (offering a framework of rights
incorporating minors' expectations).
3 Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966).
4 See Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. 371, 381-
382, 324 A.2d 562, 568 (1974).
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represent children in all disputed custody cases,5 little attention has
been given to the special concerns raised by allegations of incest dur-
ing custody disputes.
This Comment argues that allegations of sexual abuse made
during custody disputes raise a particular need for independent legal
representation of children. The predominant current legal standard,
jndicial discretion, often allows this need to go unmet. Independent
legal representation of all potential victims of sexual abuse is essen-
tial to protect effectively the "best interests" of these children.
I. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING CHILDREN'S ADVOCATES
IN PRIVATE CUSTODY DISPUTES
In general, present law does hot require independent legal rep-
resentation of children in private custody disputes. When parents
divorce or separate, the court is vested with the authority to make a
determination 6 regarding the custody of children. 7 The virtually
universal standard mandated by legislatures to determine child cus-
tody disputes is the "best interests" standard.' While the substan-
tive law of custody gives children a right to a determination made in
5 Many of the sources cited in this Comment argue for appointing a guardian ad
litem or a child advocate in all custody or disputed custody cases. While accepting the
validity of these arguments, the author views those situations involving allegations of
sexual abuse to implicate far more serious concerns.
6 The court has jurisdiction to consider all issues surrounding the custody of
children whenever parents appear in court for a divorce, annulment, or separation.
See e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 466-56 (West 1986). Courts typically incorporate the parties' privately reached
custodial agreement into thejudgment. However, the court's best interests inquiry is
not precluded by a private agreement. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950, 955 (1979).
7 A "child" is a person who has not reached the age of state-determined civil
majority, generally eighteen years. See Soler, Costello & O'Hearn, Legal Rights of
Children in the 'United States of America, in LAw AND THE STATUS OF THE CHILD 675, 683
(A. Pappas ed. 1983) [hereinafter Legal Rights of Children]. Under the common law, a
child under the age of seven was deemed incapable of forming the requisite intent to
commit a crime. See id. at 683. Notably, the seven-year cut-off is often used as the
age at which children are deemed to be competent to direct their attorneys. See, e.g.,
JUVENILE LAw CENTER OF PHILADELPHIA, MODEL OF REPRESENTATION IN DEPENDENT
COURT 7 (1986) ("When representing clients under age seven, we will assert rights
on our client's behalf.").
8 See e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b) (West 1983 & Supp 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 466-54 (West 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-911(a)(5), -914(a) (1981); HAw.
REV. STAT. § 571-46(1) (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1984); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 208, § 31 (Law. Co-op 1989); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 240
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1990); .ee also UNIFORM MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402
(1974); Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377, 1383 (D.C. 1978) (holding that child's
best interests are sole criterion in custody dispute between [biological] parents).
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their "best interest," children generally do not have the right to have
their views regarding their interests presented to the court.9
Recent standards issued by the American Bar Association would
require the appointment of independent counsel in custody cases.1 °
Only two states, however, mandate the appointment of a representa-
tive in all divorce-related custody disputes. 1 In most states, the
appointment of a representative for children in private custody dis-
putes is a matter of judicial discretiQn, either by statute 12 or by the
judge's inherent power.1
3
9 See Note, Due Process for Children: A Right to Counsel in Custody Proceedings, 4
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 177, 177 (1974) [hereinafter Due Process].
10 See A.B.A.-I.J.A. STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES
(1980), reprinted in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS CHRONICLE, Dec. 1983, at 3; see also A Divorce
Reform Act, 5 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 563, 583 (1968) (model act for child advocacy drafted
by the Legislative Research Bureau of Harvard Law School which would require the
appointment of independent counsel for all children whose rights might be affected
in a divorce proceeding).
II See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-a (Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.045
(West 1981); Lane, The Guardian ad Litem in Divorce Cases, in FOUNDATIONS OF CHILD
ADVOCACY 161, 164 (D. Bross & L. Michaels eds. 1987) (noting that Wisconsin and
New Hampshire are the only two states which require the appointment of a guardian
ad litem). Neither of these statutes makes special provisions for allegations of sexual
abuse; counsel is provided in all disputed custody cases.
12 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 4606 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989) (providing for
appointment of counsel upon court finding that appointment would be in child's best
interests); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 466-54 (West 1971) (same); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-918(b) (1981) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(8) (1985) (providing for
appointment of guardian ad litem); MASS. ANr4. LAws. ch. 215, § 56A (Law. Co-op.
1986) (providing for appointment of guardian ad litem for investigative purposes);
N.Y. JUD. LAw § 249 (McKinney 1983) (providing for appointment of law guardian
where child is party to certain proceedings if child is sought to be placed in protective
custody); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.110 (1986) (allowing for appointment of
attorney if in child's best interests); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.045 (West 1981) (allowing
for appointment of attorney where court has reason for "special concern"). States
are split as to whether or not the appointed person must be an attorney. The
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act permits the appointment of an attorney in private
custody disputes to act as an advocate on behalf of the child. See UNIF. MARRIAGE &
DIVORCE Aar § 310, 9A U.L.A. 443 (1987). States may attempt to follow a policy of
representation although the statutory language is permissive. See Lane, supra note 11,
at 164. But see Foster & Freed, supra note 2, at 355 n.40 (stating that while Dom. Rel.
Law. § 215-c, enacted in California, Iowa, Oregon, and New York, authorizes the
appointment of a guardian in divorce cases, such authority is rarely exercised).
13 See, e.g. Villareal v. State Dep't of Transp., 160 Ariz. 474, 481, 774 P.2d 213,
220 (1989) (stating that to ensure protection of rights of children, a trial judge may,
upon his or her own motion, appoint a guardian ad litem); Gardner v. Gardner, 545
So.2d 339, 340 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that in a custody case, the trial
court has the option of appointing guardian ad litem if circumstances demand it); In re
Marriage of Strauss, 183 Ill. App. 3d 424, 539 N.E.2d 808, 811 (1989) (holding that
the courts have inherent power to appoint guardian ad litem for minors' interest in
litigation); Parrillo v. Parrillo, 495 A.2d 683, 686 (R.I. 1985) (stating that "[ilt is well
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Statutes granting discretionary power typically permit ajudge to
appoint a guardian ad litem 14 or an attorney when the court deter-
mines that such appointment would be in a child's "best interests"
during custody, support, and visitation proceedings. 15 This standard
is inherently indeterminate. Statutes may specify factors for consid-
eration,16 but a judge's discretion in determining what constitutes a
child's best interests is accorded great latitude. When evidence is
contradictory, as it typically is in sexual abuse cases, the trial judge is
settled that the trial justice has the inherent power to appoint a guardian ad litem
whenever there are interests of a minor to be protected"). The statutes merely
supplement the court's inherent equity jurisdiction and do not displace it. See Due
Process, supra note 9, at 179 n.13.
14 A guardian ad litem is generally defined as "a person invested during a legal
proceeding with the power and duty to protect the rights and interests of a child (or
an incompetent) involved in litigation." Davidson, The Guardian Ad Litem, CHILDREN
TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 1. There is no consensus as to the duties of the guardian
ad litem. See id. The child advocate traditionally is granted some discretion to
determine what the child's best interests may be. See Genden, Separate Legal
Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial
Proceedings, 11 HAuv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 565, 588 (1976); infra text accompanying
notes 51-67.
15 See, e.g., CAL. CrV. CODE § 4606 (West 1989) (providing that in a proceeding
in which custody is an issue, the court may, "if it finds it would be in the best interests
of the minor child," appoint a guardian ad litem). Other statutes have enunciated this
"best interests" standard in different ways. See, e.g., N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-09-06.4
(1981) (providing that a guardian ad litem may be appointed where there is "special
concern as to the future of the minor children"); OHIO R. Crv. P. § 75(B)(2)
(Anderson 1989) (providing for the guardian ad litem when "essential to protect the
child's interests").
The "best interests" standard is vague because society lacks a consensus about
the determining values which define what is "best." The standard is even more
difficult because unlike traditional litigation based on past conduct, a best interests
analysis requires a prediction of future behavior. See Lane, supra note 11, at 176
(noting that continued use of the best interest standard promotes the denial of a
child's due process right); Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the
Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LA.w & CONrtEMP. PROBS. 226, 258-59 (1975) (noting that the
determination of what is "best" or "least detrimental" for a child is usually
speculative).
16 See e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE AcT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987)
(specifying parent's wishes as to custody, child's wishes as to custodian, child's
interaction with parents, siblings, and others who may significantly affect best
interests, child's adjustment to home, school, and community, and mental and
physical health of all individuals involved, all taken into consideration); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-124 (Supp. 1984) (Court shall consider all relevant factors including
[those of UMDA § 402] and the ability of the custodian to encourage child's
relationship with noncustodial parent); 1984 MINN. LAws 518.17 Subdiv. I (including
wishes of parents, reasonable preference of child if deemed old enough, continuity of
environment, and cultural background); cf. ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1983) (articulating
standard as custody that may seem right and proper having regard to parents'
prudence and moral character).
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the sole evaluator of the credibility of evidence and subsequent
review presumes reasonableness.'
7
Some courts have recognized the need for independent counsel
in particularly bitter and protracted custody proceedings.'
8
Divorced or divorcing parents' hostility toward one another may
overshadow concern for the child's interests; as a result, the chil-
dren's rights likely will not be fairly represented by the parents'
counsel.' 9 Appointing a legal representative "assure[s] that one'
voice will be raised in sole representation of the best interests of
th[e] minor child." 20
Operating under a discretionary statute, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals found a trial court to have erred by failing to appoint a rep-
resentative for two teenage girls in a custody suit in which sexual
abuse by the step-father was alleged.2' The court recognized that
when physical and emotional safety are in question, the interests of
children are different from their parents and will not adequately be
represented without "vigorous, independent representation of the
children by counsel acting only in their interest. "22
Similarly, a Missouri Court of Appeals held that it is an abuse of
discretion not to appoint a representative when the choice of custo-
dian is at issue and the "court has knowledge, from the pleadings or
from any other source, that the children.. have been, or are being,
abused."-
2
1
When the sexual molestation of a child is even a remote possibil-
ity, allegations of sexual abuse should automatically evoke the "spe-
cial concern" necessary under a discretionary standard to compel the
appointment of an independent representative. Because of the com-
17 See Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18
Fm. L.Q. 1, 40 (1984) (describing a recent study which found that 30 states'
appellate courts will affirm a trial court's custody decision unless it is a "clear abuse
of discretion" or is "against the manifest weight of the evidence").
18 See, e.g., Yontef v. Yontef, 185 Conn. 275, 284, 440 A.2d 899, 904 (1981)
(stating that the better course is to appoint independent counsel in seriously
contested cases); Gennarini v. Gennarini, 2 Conn. App. 132, 477 A.2d 674, 675 n.3
(1984) (same).
19 See Martinez v. Martinez, 101 N.M. 493, 496, 684 P.2d 1158, 1161 (1984)
(stating that when a child's welfare is at stake, the court would carefully review the
record to ensure the child's interests were protected); Higgins v. Higgins, 629
S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that in cases of intense hostility,
children should have the benefit of independent counsel).
20 Clark v. Clark, 358 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
21 See M.M. v. R.R.M., 358 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
22 Id. at 89.
23 Cj.(S.)R. v. G.D.S., 701 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985):
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peting notions ofparenspatriae and family autonomy,24 and the skep-
ticism with which such allegations tend to be received by judges,
however, this is not the case. Possible sexual abuse in a custody dis-
pute does not uniformly trigger the appointment of counsel. Discre-
tion allows some children who may have been sexually abused to go
unrepresented.2 5
For example, in Sucher v. Sucher,26 a Minnesota appeals court
upheld a trial court's refusal to appoint a guardian ad litem to repre-
sent three children in a custody battle.2 '7 Despite allegations and
some evidence of sexual abuse, the trial judge's failure to appoint a
representative was held riot to be an abuse of discretion.2 8 The
child's story vacillated during an in camera interview and was there-
fore considered insufficient evidence to trigger the discretionary
standard.2 9 While the child's role in this case was critical, counsel
was denied based on the court's opinion that all the circumstances of
the children had been fully litigated and that there were no alterna-
tives which a guardian could have presented. 0
II. WHY REQUIRE INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION?
Children must be provided with independent representation
whenever allegations of sexual abuse are made because neither the
judge nor the child's parents can adequately represent the child's
interests. For the child, fundamental bodily and psychological integ-
rity is at stake. "Independent representation by counsel [whenever
the child's welfare is at stake] is the most significant and practical
reform that can be made in the area of children and the law ...
reform should be directed at [permitting] all interested parties-
including children-to have independent counsel."'"
As stated earlier, the substantive law guarantees all children in
divorce cases the right to custody determinations made in their best
24 See discussion infra notes 68-94 and accompanying text.
25 See Who's Taking Care of tile Children? They May Need Counsel, CAL. LAW., Nov.
1987, at 12 [hereinafter Who'; Taking Care] (stating that many judges, while
authorized under California Civil Code § 4606, are reluctant to appoint attorneys for
children, and adding that children often go unrepresented for want of available
attorneys).
26 416 N.W.2d 182 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
27 See id. at 185.
28 See id.
29 See id. at 183.
30 See id. at 185 (stating that foster care was the only alternative which a guardian
could have presented).
31 Foster & Freed, supra note 2, at 356.
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interests.3 2 The resolution of sexual abuse allegations will signifi-
cantly shape the judge's assessment of the child's best interests.
3 3
Yet the difficulties of proving sexual abuse3 4 are exacerbated by the
divorce context and, therefore, abuse is often not legally established
despite significant physical and psychological evidence.3 5  The
ramifications of an erroneous decision-either ordering continued
contact when a child is in actual jeopardy36 or constraining the rela-
tionship with a falsely accused parent 37 -make improved procedural
standards at both the fact-finding and disposition stages essential in
order to meet the statutory best interests mandate."8
Mandatory legal representation will ensure that the child's voice
is heard.3 9 Representation is the sole procedure which assures that
32 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
33 See e.g., MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 9-101 (Supp. 1989) (stating that
unsupervised visitation and custody shall be denied to a party whom the court finds
has abused a child, unless it is specifically found that there is no likelihood of further
abuse).
34 Sexual abuse is difficult to prove because of the lack of corroborating
witnesses, the victim's age, real and perceived problems in the credibility and
competency of the child witness, clashes with the defendant's sixth amendment
confrontation rights, and various cultural prejudices. See Apel, Custodial Parents, Child
Sexual Abuse, and the Legal Systems: Beyond Contempt, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 491, 495-501
(1989); Keating, Children in Incestuous Relationships: the Forgotten Victims, 34 Loy. L. REv.
111, 112-113 (1988).
35 See Keating supra note 34, at 113-15 (stating that societal disbelief of the
frequency of incest leads to judicial prejudice against accusing parents); see also infra
text accompanying notes 101-04.
36 See Goldson, Child Development and the Response to Maltreatment, in FOUNDATIONS
OF CHILD ADVOCACY 3, 13 (D. Bross & L. Michaels eds. 1987) (noting common
symptoms of withdrawal, self-abusive behavior, and internalized guilt resulting from
disruption of normal psychological development); Kerns, The Pediatric Perspective, in
FOUNDATIONS OF CHILD ADVOCACY, supra, at 23, 33 (stating that the psychological
impact of sexual abuse ranges from acute trauma to the catastrophic and continuing
developmental damage associated with continued incest).
37 See SECOND CHANCES, supra note 2, at 257 (recognizing the importance of
maintaining two parents in the postdivorce family for the child's self-esteem and
psychological well-being).
38 See Besharov, The Need to Narrow the Grounds for State Intervention, in
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE & NEGLECT: POLICY AND PRACTICE 47 (C.
Thomas ed. 1988), reprinted in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 32, 36 (American Bar
Ass'n. Nat'l Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection eds. 1989);
Genden, supra note 14, at 565 (noting that children's rights and interests are
jeopardized when their best interests are determined without an independent
advocate).
39 See Hansen, Guardians Ad Litem in Divorce and Custody Cases: Protection of the
Child's Interests, 4J. FAM. L. 181, 184 (1964) (discussing the Milwaukee Family Court
system of appointing a guardian ad litem whenever custody is disputed and stating
that having an advocate ensures court concern for the rights of children); cf Who's
Taking Care, supra note 25, at 12 (noting the perception of a Juvenile Court
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all matters of law will be available for the determination of the child's
best interests.40 Without independent representation, the child,
whether an actual victim of incest or not, risks needless abuse by the
legal system charged to protect her best interests. Even if sexual
abuse is not ultimately proven,4 1 the allegations themselves generate
the need for representation because of the physical, psychological,
and emotional probing of the fact-finding process. Any court adjudi-
cating claims of sexual abuse without the participation of the child's
advocate is relying on indirect, secondary evidence from parents,
psychologists, and physicians. It is curious that when the potential
harm to a child is so great, the judicial system would grant such
importance to secondary evidence "when direct evidence is so easily
obtainable. The best interests of a child can best be determined on
the basis of objective, independent evidence . . . made available to
the court [by] independent counsel."42
The family court forum in which a judge considers allegations of
sexual abuse made during divorce proceedings poses unique
problems for the sexually abused child which necessitate according
the child the extra procedural protection of a voice.4- Family courts
are traditionally concerned with the equitable distribution of prop-
erty and the reasonable access of both parents to their children. In
fact, good faith allegations are insufficient summarily to halt contin-
ued contact with an alleged abuser. In "normal" divorce cases, pre-
serving the continued contact of children with both parents is
justifiable., When a child is subjected to sexual molestation, however,
continued contact is exceedingly harmful.44
Sucher v. Sucher4 5 demonstrates the potential dangers of a system
in which appointment of independent representation is discretion-
ary. The trial judge is not in a position to determine whether the
Commissioner that an advocate is needed when there are serious allegations of child
abuse or when a controversial issue such as religious lifestyle threatens to overwhelm
the child's interests).
40 See Due Process, supra note 9, at 185.
41 Commentators have observed that in many cases "presexual conditioning," a
precursor to molestation, has taken place, even if actual sexual abuse has not yet
occurred. See Walker & Edwall, Domestic Violence and Determination of Visitation and
Custody in Divorce, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL 127, 136 (D. Sonkin ed. 1987).
42 Inker & Perretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 5 FAM. L. Q. 108,
115 (1971).
43 See Keating, supra note 34, at 112 (noting that "[s]uch courts are set up to
compromise and settle difficulties between two spouses").
44 See id.
45 416 N.W.2d 182 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). See supra notes 26-30 and
accompanying text for discussion.
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child's circumstances, from the child's point of view, have been fully
litigated. Rather, the advocate for the child, who is obligated to rep-
resent the child's interests, should make this determination. As the
court stated in M.M. v. R.R.M.,4 6 when "the missing element [is] vig-
orous, independent representation of the children by counsel," the
record available for the trial judge will be "woefully incomplete.",
47
Finally, the discretionary standard is an inadequate safeguard
when the consequences of a wrong decision are as devastating as
those following incest.4" The legal representation of children is one
affirmative step that can help the legal system operate in favor of
abused children. While independent legal representation does not
promise a complete solution to the dilemmas posed by sexual abuse
allegations in divorce cases, the appearance of an attorney for the
child may help a judge make "reasoned determinations of fact
and... disposition.",41 Suspected victims of sexual abuse need the
"assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled
inquiry into the facts, [and] to insist upon regularity of the proceed-
ings."5 ° In order to determine the best interests of children, the
child's voice must be heard in all cases in which sexual abuse is
alleged.
III. THE ROLE OF THE CHILD's REPRESENTATIVE
Ambiguity about the attorney's role in family litigation has
emerged as an important issue in recent years.S The role of chil-
46 358 N.W.2d 86 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
47 Id. at 89.
48 The effects of incest follow its victims into adulthood: creating cynical,
troubled, and possibly dangerous adults and perpetuating a vicious cycle as the
adults who were child-victims become offenders. See supra note 36. It is only by
breaking the cycle of grossly inadequate parent-child relationships that society stands
to gain capable parents for the future. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrT,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 7 (1983). Teaching children that the
abuser will be sanctioned helps to break the cycle. Acting to ensure the proper
adjudication of allegations of sexual abuse is not merely an act of humane concern
for children, but also an act of enlightened societal self interest. See Delaney, The
Battered Child and the Law, in HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND His FAMILY, 187, 193
(C. Kempe & R. Helfer eds. 1972) [hereinafter HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD]
49 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 40 (1967) (quoting N.Y. Family Court Act § 241 with
approval and holding that a juvenile has a right to counsel in a serious delinquency
proceeding) (discussed infra at notes 117-22 and accompanying text).
50 Id. at 36.
51 See Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Child Abuse Cases, in HELPING THE BATrERED
CHILD, supra note 48, at 225 (stating that acceptance of social work techniques and
objectives in the judicial process has created much uncertainty as to the role of
counsel in family litigation).
1990] 1391
1392 UNIVERSITY OF PENNWSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:1383
dren's counsel is often undefined and, consequently, hotly dis-
puted.5 2 Should she play the role of a guardian ad litem, who
determines what is best for a child,5 3 or that of an advocate, who is
obligated to present the wishes of her client? Also, should the child's
representative, regardless of role, be required to be an attorney?
In order to ensure that the child's voice is heard in court, a rep-
resentative should be an advocate who will advance the child's posi-
tion and not make independent judgments of the child's best
interests.' An advocate, unlike a traditional guardian ad litem,5 5
insures that the child's voice is heard with full force in legal proceed-
ings. To be effective, such an advocate should also be a lawyer.
5 6
The following credo characterizes the role the attorney should play:
52 See, e.g., Redeker, The Right of an Abused Child to Independent Counsel and the Role
of the ChildAcvocate in ChildAbuse Cases, 23 VILL. L. REV. 521, 539 (1978) (arguing that
the guardian ad litem representation of state-determined "best interests" does not
fulfill the child's need for counsel); Representing Dependent Children, CHILDREN's RiGrrs
CHRONICLE, Dec. 1983, at 1 (discussing the lack of a clear model of representation in
dependency cases).
53 See supra note 14 (defining guardian ad litem).
54 See Redeker, supra note 52, at 539-42 (advocating the need for legal counsel
representing the child, and criticizing the concept of guardians ad litem); Genden,
supra note 14, at 588-89; see also Bross, An Introduction to Child Representation, in
FOUNDATIONS OF CHILD ADVOCACY 85, 86 (D. Bross & L. Michaels eds. 1987) (noting
that confusion as to the role of the attorney, even when the child cannot express her
wishes is not justified, since "[ilt is no longer a question that objective standards can
be established for representation of incompetent adults or other individuals"). Even
when a client is too young to direct an attorney, the closest approximation of a
normal attorney-client relationship, uninfluenced by third parties, best achieves the
desired representation. See Comment, Speaking For a Child: The Role of Independent
Counsel for Minors, 75 CALIF. L. Rav. 681, 701-05 (1987) (advocating a doctrine of
substituted judgment whereby an attorney focuses on what the particular child, if
mature, would desire).
55 See Note, Lawyeringfor the Child, 87 YALE L. J. 1126, 1140-41 (1978) (noting
that the traditional guardian ad liten is a nonadvocate representative, more properly
termed an investigator).
56 While not dismissing those child advocacy programs which have utilized non-
lawyers, see, e.g., Blady, Special Child Advocates: A Volunteer Court Program, CHILDREN
TODAY, May-June 1981, at 2 (discussing the benefits of court appointed special
advocate volunteer programs in representing children); Comment, The Non-Lawyer
Guardian ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, 58 WASH. L. REV. 853, 864-67
(1983) (describing a program using non-lawyer volunteers backed up by lawyers),
this Comment is based on the premise that the child's voice must be one "guided by
relevant legal tradition and principles." Bross, supra note 54, at 85. The child's
advocate must handle the maze of legal rules in order to "facilitate the legal process
so that the child is not damaged or compromised by a system whose goals should be
to protect the child, but which . . . may . . . lose sight of the child's needs and
capacities." Goldson, supra note 36, at 17-18.
A tension between social work and law is unavoidable in this context. Each has
its role for the child and, in the ideal situation, there will be an attorney advocate and
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We are, first, lawyers charged with representing clients.... [E]ven
though our client may be young, when he or she is capable of exer-
cising minimal judgment we will represent the client's position to
the court.... We will not represent a position to the court that is
contrary to our client's wishes .... We do not believe that it is
appropriate for [us] to assume the function of the court ....57
The court ultimately is responsible for the child's best interests:
"the trial court does not function solely as an arbiter between...
private parties [but must] determine what... would best guarantee
an opportunity for the children involved to grow [in]to mature and
responsible citizens." 5 8 A preliminary assessment by an advocate of
these best interests usurps the judge's authority and prejudices the
determination. While social and psychological expert testimony aids
the judge in her determination of the child's "best interests," the
child's voice must be heard and must inform any truly valid
determination.
The child's advocate should represent only the interests of the
child, and not consider the competing claims of the parents in the
custody case. Once a parent's claim affects the representation, the
child effectively has lost her advocate. For example, even when a
child expresses terror and pleads with her "advocate" not to send
her to an alleged abuser, the counsel who is affected by parents' con-
cerns may fail to oppose visitation.5 9 In this scenario, what force
does the child's voice really have? Who protects the child from the
lawyer, and why have a lawyer at all?6"
When the attorney is guided by her conception of a child's best
interests and not by the voice of the child, interest conflicts or dimin-
ished representation may be overlooked. For example, in one paren-
a guardian ad litem. If there is only one representative, it ought to be the attorney,
and the social worker can testify as a witness for the child as the American Bar
Association has suggested. See infra notes 64-66.
57 Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia, JLC Model of Representation in
Dependent Court (draft Feb. 24, 1986).
58 Hansen, supra note 39, at 184 (quoting Kritzik v. Kritzik, 21 Wis. 2d 442, 124
N.W.2d 581 (1963)).
59 See, e.g., Apel, supra note 34, at 492-93 (containing an excellent chronology of
the Morgan case); Hilary's Guardian: A Breach of Trust, Legal Times, Feb. 20, 1989, at
19, col. 4 (letter to editor claiming that although empowered to cancel or interrupt
visits, the guardian of Hilary Foretich, the child in the highly publicized Morgan-
Foretich case, did not do so despite the child's express wishes). This scenario is
especially problematic because of the preference for keeping families and parent-
child relationships intact. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
60 See Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia, supra note 57, at 2 (expressing
concern that lawyers will "present a case that is contrary to a client's wishes").
1990] 1393
1394 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:1383
tal rights termination proceeding where abuse was alleged, the
"advocate of the child's best interests" standard permitted the dual
representation of two children whose wishes were diametrically
opposed. One child wanted to return to her mother while the other
child did not.6 1 Because the children's counsel's role was to advo-
cate the children's best interests, however, the Iowa Supreme Court
found no "actual" conflict.6 2 Furthermore, because it was ajuvenile
proceeding, the court was unwilling to presume prejudice from the
dual representation "even if under ordinary [criminal] standards a
substantial possibility of conflict would be shown."63
Standards proposed jointly by the American Bar Association and
the Institute for Judicial Administration expressly reject the tradi-
tional guardian ad litem model of representing children and urge
advocacy of the child's interests.6 In protective proceedings "where
the juvenile is capable of considered judgment on his or her own
behalf, determination of the client's interest in the proceeding
should ultimately remain the client's responsibility., 65 The intro-
duction to the Standards claims that this model of the lawyer-client
relationship is necessary to achieve fundamental goals of the legal
system, including enforcement of the child's substantive rights and
facilitation of accurate determination of factual and legal issues
through the adversary process.
66
Whenever there is suspicion that children have been sexually
abused, representation by an attorney acting as an advocate should
be required.6 7 Any legislation requiring representation must clearly
61 See In reJ.P.B. and C.R.B.. 419 N.W.2d 387 (Iowa 1988) (claiming that the
dual representation did not prevent the effective representation of the child who
wished to remain with the petitioner).
62 See id. at 390.
63 Id. at 392.
64 See IJA-ABA JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS
RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES Standard 3.1 (a) (1976).
65 Id. at Standard 3.1(b)(ii)(b). However, the Standard continues that in cases
involving "very young persons" the child
may be incapable of considered judgment, in which case responsibility
passes to the guardian ad litem. If no guardian ad litem has been appointed,
the attorney is to determine the child's interest after inquiring into all
relevant circumstances or may elect to confine her role to fact finding only
and take no position before the court.
Id. at Standard 3.1(b)(ii)(c) and comment.
66 See id. at 3-5 (introduction to standards).
67 See de Montigny v. de Montigny, 70 Wis. 2d 131, 138, 233 N.W.2d 463, 467
(1975) ("It is clear that a guardian ad litem appointed to represent children is more
than a nominal representative appointed to counsel and consult with the trial judge.
Rather, he has all the duties, powers, and responsibilities of counsel who represents a
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delineate the responsibility of the child advocate in order to provide
all incest victims the voice needed to protect their interests.
IV. ADDRESSING THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST INDEPENDENT
LEGAL REPRESENTATION
A. Parens Patriae
Children in private custody battles where sexual abuse is alleged
currently must rely on judicial discretion for independent legal rep-
resentation.6" Parens patriae, a derivative of English common law, is
often used as a spearhead against the use of children's advocates; the
notion is that "[tlhe king should protect all who have no other pro-
tector, that he is the guardian above all guardians .... The king's
justices see no great reason why every infant should have a perma-
nent guardian, because they believe that they can do full justice to
infants."6 9 Many judges believe that the parents' representatives
and the "independent investigative powers and duties of the
court . . . adequately protect the children's interests and renders
unnecessary the extra expense and delay of cases by court appoint-
ment of counsel to independently represent the children."
70
According to the parens patriae doctrine, children do not need
independent legal representation because their interests are pro-
tected by the court itself. The legal system relies heavily on this
premise.
71
As noted in a Bill of Rights for Children, it is an anomaly that chil-
dren in any divorce proceeding are unrepresented. "The major dis-
puted issue may be their custody and visitation rights, and in a very
real sense, they may be the principal parties in interest since the ulti-
mate issue ... is their welfare and best interests."' 72 This argument
has greater force when sexual abuse is alleged, because the court
party to litigation."); c.f Vande Hoven v. Vande Hoven, 336 N.W.2d 366, 368 (N.D.
1983) (stating in dicta that where sexual abuse is alleged, "it appears to be in the best
interests of the children to have their guardian ad litem bestowed with full advocacy
authority"). Note that the court in Vande Hoven was operating under a statutory
requirement that a guardian ad litem was to advocate the best interests. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-06.4 (1981).
68 See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text (describing the discretionary
standard as the current state of the law).
69 II F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 445 (2d ed.
1899).
70 Chalupa v. Chalupa, 220 Neb. 704, 705-06, 371 N.W.2d 706, 707-08 (1985).
71 See Legal Rights of Children, supra note 7, at 677 n.14 (noting current American
law).
72 Foster & Freed, supra note 2, at 355.
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decides not only which parent will have custody but whether or not
the child's body and mind will continue to be invaded. Regrettably,
these children are legally no more entitled to a "voice" than children
in any other custody dispute.
If the victim of incest is to realize her right to legal protection,
her story must first be heard. 73 As a Milwaukee family court judge
who has instituted the appointment of guardians ad litem in all dis-
puted custody cases has noted:
When two terriers fight over a bone, the bone does not join the
fighting. But a child is not a thing or an object to go as a prize to
the winner of a contest .... The whole future life of the child will
be affected by the court's decision .... Will such basic interests of
the child be adequately represented or even presented to the court
by the attorneys for the warring litigants? . . Is not a minor and
dependent child whose parents are involved in a divorce case enti-
tled to ... representation [similar to that given to a child in a tort
or probate action] at least in those cases in which custody becomes
a matter of dispute between the parties or concern to the court?
74
Judges who serve as protectors of children's social and legal
interests sacrifice impartiality.' 5 The composite voices of social psy-
chologists, physicians, parents, and young children upon which
judges may rely cannot equal the autonomous legal voices of chil-
dren themselves. 76 Professor Laurence Tribe recognized the poten-
tial limits of wise and benevolent paternalism, stating:
If the universality of the childhood experience.., could guarantee
empathy from adult lawmakers despite the absence of children
from legislative assemblies, there would be no occasion to regard
children as an isolated and unrepresented minority in need of spe-
cial protection; but if adults instead look with contempt -at a stage
they have "outgrown" and will never re-enter, then every privilege
withheld... from the young must become a source of suspicion.
77
73 See id. ("The right to be heard includes the right to have standing in legal
proceedings to assert one's claims of interest.").
74 Hansen, supra note 39, at 181-82.
75 See Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Child Abuse Cases, in HELPING THE BATrERED
CHILD AND His FAMILY 225, 229 (C. Kempe & R. Helfer eds. 1972) ("Even the judge
cannot adequately serve as protector of the legal ... interests of the child without
seriously sacrificing the appearance of impartiality").
76 See Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive Presumptions: Three
Linked Riddles, 39 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROas. 8, 12 n. 14 (Summer 1975) (stating that the
basic message of In re Gault, discussed infra at notes 117-22 and accompanying text, is
that "the best paternalistic intentions toward children cannot substitute for
procedurally fair juvenile hearings").
77 Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).
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In order to ensure the vitality of the legal system, judges must
recognize that today's children may view situations such as custody
and visitation in unique and unprecedented ways. The need for an
individualized voice is critical in this context because determinations
are based on the best interests analysis, and society lacks a consensus
regarding what is "best" for children. 7' Thus, when the conse-
quences of a disposition may be irreparably harmful, as in the case of
sexual abuse, 79 individualized children's voices must be heard.
Independent legal representation that articulates the voice of each
child is the best way to accomplish this objective.
B. Familial Privacy
Another obstacle to the independent representation of allegedly
abused children in private custody cases stems from a perception of
the American family as an autonomous "private government" with
protected interests.8" Because children legally are incapable of
determining what is in their best interests, and parents legally are
presumed competent to represent their children's interests,
appointing counsel for children is often seen as infringing on paren-
tal rights.8 '
Society protects the right of individuals to marry,82 to procreate
or not to procreate,8 3 and, increasingly, to define themselves as
78 See id at 27 (calling for individualization when the dissolving moral consensus
affects agreed-upon fundamental rights, such as the circumstances warranting
depriving a parent of the right to raise her child).
79 See supra note 36 (discussing the consequences of sexual abuse).
80 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (reserving a
constitutionally protected sphere of privacy within a family). The view of the family
as a private "corporation" dictates that the state will do everything to support the
unification of the family. Therefore, it is rare for a court to deny visitation rights
even if there is known physical and sexual abuse of the child. See DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 149 (D.
Sonkin ed. 1987).
81 SeeJ. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrr, supra note 48, at 9-14 (discussing the
legal status of children); Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented But Not Heard:
Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 76, 121-22 (1984)
(arguing that because the best interests test makes virtually all aspects of a parent's
life relevant, a child advocate may probe into "deeply held secrets" which parents
have privately agreed to keep out of the court's consideration).
82 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (holding that the right to
marry is fundamental).
83 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-85 (creating a marital privacy right derived from
Bill of Rights guarantees). A drastically different approach would be to require state
licensing of all prospective biological and adoptive parents. See LaFollette, Licensing
Parents, 9 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 182 (1980) (supporting such licensing).
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"families" for many purposes.8 4 Families may protect themselves
against state intrusion by invoking constitutionally protected rights
of privacy.8 5 It is incongruous, however, to restrict the exercise of
such rights to traditional family units while ignoring the individual
rights of children from shattered families.8 6 The theory of the family
as an inviolable unit presumes that the family is intact and can be
counted on to protect its members.8 7 When divorce and abuse dis-
integrate the family social unit, viewing the family as paramount may
fail to protect the child.8 8
Parents embroiled in custody disputes involving allegations of
abuse are particularly inappropriate representatives of their child's
welfare or wishes.8 9 When one parent alleges sexual abuse by the
other, the accused parent's judgment and parental fitness is ques-
84 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating a
housing ordinance which did not recognize a grandparent and grandchild as a
"family," arbitrarily cutting off the protection of family rights at the boundary of the
nuclear family); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842-47
(1977) (suggesting that foster families have sufficient indicia of "family" to entitle
them to some constitutional protection); Santa Brbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123,
610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980) (relying on a state constitutional privacy
provision to strike down city zoning ordinance that defined family to exclude groups
of more than five unmarried people); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201,
543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989) (holding that a homosexual relationship
constitutes a "family" under New York City's rent-control regulations); Gutis, What Is
A Family? Traditional Limits Are Being Redrawn, N.Y. Times, August 31, 1989, at C1,
col. 5 (discussing Braschi and "domestic partnership laws," noting that as society
changes, the definition of family also changes, and quoting Professor Robert F. Kelly:
"the law is basically trying to catch up to these transformations in family structure").
85 See Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential
Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 4 & n.35 (1980).
86 See supra text accompanying note 72.
87 See SECOND CHANCES, supra note 2, at 17 (noting that the present
understanding of child development and family life is almost entirely based on the
intact family form).
88 SeeJ. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrr, supra note 48, at 66 (stating that "the
presumption [of parental representation] should not prevail . . . once the child's
placement becomes the subject of a dispute" taken to the courts and in other
situations where there is no "conflict-free interest" in representing the child). In
these cases, the child should be accorded party status and given independent
representation. See id.; Inker & Perretta, supra note 42, at 11; Podell, The "Why"
Behind Appointing Guardians Ad Litem for Children in Divorce Proceedings, 57 MARQ. L.
REV. 103, 103 (1973) (stating that the child of divorce is a "disenfranchised victim
used as a pawn in a game of chess being played between its warring parents who
frequently want the court to physically cut up and divide the child between them in
the same manner that they have [done] emotionally").
89 See Lempp, Child Welfare and the Law: A Medical and Psychiatric Viewpoint, in THE
CHILD AND THE LAw 213, 221 (F. Bates ed. 1976) (discussing the protection of
children's interests in divorce actions).
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tioned.9° As an interested party, each parent should be presumed
incapable of presenting a voice that contradicts his or her own.
9 1
Neither parent can be relied upon to speak for the child; conse-
quently, an extremely deferential approach to the parents is no
longer viable. For this reason, the child's voice must be heard in
order to procedurally protect her best interests. This need out-
weighs competing concerns.9 2 To assume that the parents' attorneys
have covered the entire agenda ignores the reality that "in countless
circumstances a juvenile's rights and interests ... are at sharp vari-
ance with those of his parents."9 " The possibility of abuse and alle-
gations of such certainly constitute one of those circumstances.
Indeed, "[w]ithout a separate advocate, the court may not perceive
the existence of the special needs of the child."9' 4
V. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION
This Comment has argued that when sexual abuse is alleged, a
statutory commitment to a best interests determination requires the
procedural protection of independent legal representation for a
child. In addition to the best interests rationale, reform in the pri-
vate custody dispute context may be based on analogous statutory
authority or on constitutional grounds. Ultimately, finding constitu-
tional authority is less important9 5 than sensitizing courts and legis-
lators to the need of every child for independent counsel when
allegations of sexual abuse are asserted. In the end, however, judi-
cial discretion is too slim a reed upon which to rest the right to be
free from sexual molestation. Legislators have already recognized
that when the state alleges abuse, a child must be provided represen-
90 See Bross, supra note 54, at 86.
91 See Redeker, supra note 52, at 527-28. Just as the rights of the parent or
custodian and the rights of a child conflict in a child abuse action, so too does a
conflict exist between the child and her parents in a custody suit where abuse is
alleged. Just as the state is an "interested party" when it initiates abuse proceedings
against a parent, parents suing for custody are also parties with interests distinct from
the child's. See id
92 cf. Podell, supra note 88, at 107 (dismissing parental objections to counsel as
lacking merit in light of the child's interests). Arguments in favor of parental privacy
rights rely heavily on the premise that both parents in a custody dispute are fit and,
therefore, that a child without counsel faces only a small risk of damage. See
Guggenheim, supra note 81, at 121-22. Continued sexual abuse by one of the parents
obviously negates this underlying premise.
93 In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 87, 185 N.E.2d 128, 130 (1962).
94 Genden, supra note 14, at 573.
95 See id. at 581 (noting that avoiding constitutional issues may be advantageous
as a matter of litigation strategy).
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tation. This right of representation must be extended to include the
children in private custody disputes who are possible victims of
abuse.
A. Analogy to State-Initiated Investigations of Abuse
When a state alleges abuse, the child who is the subject of the
custody proceeding is generally statutorily guaranteed representa-
tion. Such a guarantee is strongly supported by the federal govern-
ment, particularly in cases of child sexual abuse.9 6 The Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act9 7 conditions the granting of federal
funds for the handling of child abuse cases on a state's provision of a
guardian ad litem to represent the child in "every case involving an
abused or neglected child 'which results in a judicial proceeding."
9 8
State statutes commonly require that when the state alleges abuse,
96 While it was once assumed that the judge, the attorney for the child's parents,
and the attorney for the agency bringing proceedings were capable of adequately
representing the child's interests, an "analysis of the roles and responsibilities of
these attorneys shows that they cannot fully represent the interests of the child and
that there is a clear and demonstrable need to provide the child with independent
representation in abuse and neglect proceedings." NAT'L CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPRESENTATION FOR THE ABUSED
AND NEGLECTED CHILD: THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM AND LEGAL COUNSEL 2 (1980).
Congress has recognized that child abuse is a steadily increasing problem of
significant national magnitude that imposes both social and economic costs on its
victims and on society. See H.R. REP. No. 135, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 20-21,
reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 72, 75, 77. In recognition of the
problem, Congress has acted to impose responsibilities on the states and federal
government to monitor the effectiveness and facilitate the improvement of the
independent legal representation of children in abuse cases. See, e.g., Child Abuse
Prevention, Adoption, and Family Services Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-294, 102
Stat. 102, 118 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 5105 note (West Supp. 1989))
(requiring the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect to study the provisions of
legal representation of children in each state as well as the effectiveness of such
representation); id. at 113-16 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106c(c)-(e)
(West Supp. 1989)) (requiring as a predicate for federal funding of the handling of
child abuse cases, particularly cases of sexual abuse, that each state designate a task
force whose recommendations must be adopted).
97 42 U.S.C.A. § 5101-07 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989). The 1988 amendments to
the Act seek to (1) improve the quality of the administration of the National Center
on Child Abuse and Neglect; (2) strengthen the coordination of its efforts with other
federal agencies to implement a unified approach to guide national priorities; (3)
expand the activities to be performed with regard to the collection and dissemination
of research and data; and (4) emphasize the importance of identification and
prevention efforts. See H.R. REP. No. 135, supra note 96, at 22-25, reprinted in 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEw; 72, 78-82.
98 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106a(b)(6) (West Supp. 1989). The statute's effectiveness
may be questioned given that it does not specify whether the guardian ad litem must
be an attorney.
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the child must be provided with independent representation.99 The
federal and state governments, however, have not extended this
right to the many potentially sexually abused children in private cus-
tody disputes. Given Congress' express recognition of the impor-
tance of representation in sexual abuse cases brought by the state,
the different treatment of children in private cases, is unjustified.
Their interests are coextensive with those of children in state-initi-
ated proceedings.
One might attempt to draw distinctions between sexual abuse
proceedings initiated by the state and those which are not, in an
effort to argue that the child's need for representation is less' critical
in a private custody dispute. As demonstrated below, these distinc-
tions are specious.
1. The Veracity of Allegations Made in the Divorce "War"
There is a commonly held assumption that allegations of sexual
abuse made by "warring" spouses are more likely to be false than
allegations made by a state agency.100 Based on this assumption, the
need for procedural safeguards, such as independent representation,
is perceived as less critical in private custody disputes. Recent stud-
ies have shown this assumption to be unfounded:
The number of sexual abuse charges arising during divorces
and/or custody/visitation disputes are small in number, only a very
small percentage of even the contested cases.
The number of cases involving such allegations has increased
in recent years, as have sexual abuse reports in the general
population....
At present, there is no evidence to suggest that allegations
arising at the time of divorces or custody disputes are more likely
to be false.
99 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §'47.17.030(e) (1984) (providing for representation by
a guardian ad litem); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 326 (West 1984) (making official who
files petition alleging abuse the child's guardian ad litem); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.23
(West 1976) (providing for appointment of law guardian in abuse cases); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.23(3m) (1987) (requiring appointment of counsel under certain conditions
when abuse is alleged); see also MODEL CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT REP. LAw § 15A
(1975) (providing'that child subject to any judicial proceeding regarding child abuse
or neglect shall be entitled to legal counsel).
100 See Keating, supra note 34, at 113 (noting that the assumption may be
attributed to society's belief that the allegations in such a situation are almost always
false); Sege, Some Say Ruling Will Silence Other Women, Boston Globe, June 22, 1989, at
1 (stating that the percentage of true allegations of sexual abuse in private cases is
similar to that in cases begun by child protective agencies).
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Deliberately false allegations made to influence the custody
decision or to hurt an ex-spouse do happen but they are viewed by
knowledgeable professionals as rarities.
10 1
Society doubts the truthfulness of the allegations because "[i]t is
an easier psychological rationalization to believe that an ex-spouse
would make up these charges to get even than it is to believe that a
parent would molest his own child."1 0 2 Articles suggesting that chil-
dren are frequently "brainwashed" by vindictive spouses to believe
that they were molested, have misled legal and clinical deci-
sionmakers.' 3 Because of feelings that allegations of abuse are
likely to be false, courts maty ignore such allegations in making cus-
tody determinations.'0 4 This harms both the protective parent and
the abused child. As one observer noted, "[w]hat we really need to
be stressing to the legal and mental health community is to look at
each case as an allegation of child sexual abuse and ignore the fact
that there's a custody battle going on .... That, in and of itself, will
probably tell you very little."'0 5 Ensuring that the child's independ-
ent voice is heard is one method of counteracting misperception
regarding abuse in custody disputes.
2. Societal Stereotypes About Incest
Distinguishing sexually abused children in private custody dis-
putes from those in state-initiated proceedings also may be attrib-
uted to general reluctance to believe that incest sweeps across the
socioeconomic spectrum. The tragic death of Lisa Steinberg in New
York City chillingly illustrated that child abuse is not solely an inci-
dent of poverty or lack of education.10 6 The erroneous assumption
101 Keating, supra note 34, at 117 (quoting N. Thoennes &J. Pearson, Summary
of Findings from the Sexual Abuse Allegations Project 17-19 (1987) (unpublished
paper prepared by the Research Unit of the Association of Family and Conciliation
Courts, Denver, Colorado)).
102 Id. at 115.
103 See Letter from Graeme Hanson, M.D., to Melvin Lewis, M.D., editor, 27J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 258 (1988) (criticizing Green, True and
False Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Child Custody Disputes, 25 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 449 (1986) (concerning fabrication and collusion)).
104 See Keating, supra note 34, at 113.
105 Sege, supra note 100 (quoting Nancy Thoennes, director of the Sexual Abuse
Allegations Project in Denver).
106 Lisa Steinberg died after suffering extensive physical abuse at the hands of
her stepfather, Joel Steinberg. Steinberg, an attorney, was convicted of first-degree
manslaughter. See Sullivan, Steinberg Is Guilty of First-Degree Manslaughter, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 31, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
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that one can assess sex abusers by "type"10 7-education, wealth, or
other socioeconomic factors-means that legislators and judges are
less likely to view accusations levelled in the divorce context as truth-
ful.'10 When abuse proceedings are initiated by the state, they more
typically involve parents and children of lower socioeconomic levels.
Reporting patterns significantly obscure the economic and social dis-
tribution of child abuse. A poor family in a clinic or emergency room
setting is far more likely to be suspected, evaluated, and reported
than is an affluent family whose child is treated in a private practi-
tioner's office. 109 In less affluent neighborhoods, child protection
agencies are more likely to learn of potential danger to the child, to
force the family into the child protective system, and to provide the
child with representation. In short, abuse, including sexual abuse, is
less likely to be detected by the state if the family is of moderate or
substantial economic means. As a result, some allegations of sexual
abuse may come to the state's attention only when the parties are
engaged in a custody dispute. Unfortunately for these children, their
right to representation is often denied simply because their abuse is
revealed during a private custody dispute."o
107 See Keating, supra note 34, at 120 ("Courts all too often base a decision
solely on an evaluation of the accused parent. If he does not fit the profile of what
the evaluating professional sees as the 'type' to molest children, the court does not
deem it possible that he has molested the child.").
108 This is not to say that only people in higher socioeconomic clases have
private custody disputes. Legislators and judges may be less likely to view
accusations levelled in the divorce context as truthful not because fewer of the
stereotypical high-risk abusers-the poor and the uneducated-are in divorce court,
but because of the view that private custody proceedings are only a secondary, and
therefore relatively unimportant, source of protection for abused children. Such a
view sees abuse as occurring primarily in lower class families. According to this view,
because such abuse is likely to be detected by state agencies, triggering
representation at a judicial determination stage, there is little need for independent
representation in the divorce context; the child's interests will be protected in the
state-initiated proceeding.
109 See Kerns, supra note 36, at 24; see also Martin, The Child and His Development, in
HELPING THE BATrERED CHILD, supra note 48, at 93, 93-94 (noting that a public child
development center does not serve many middle- or upper-class families).
110 This result may be seen as discriminating against both the interests of the
children of middle to upper economic means, whose voices are not heard, and
against the parents of lower economic means, who are prosecuted with greater
frequency. Is there any reason to provide better representation to the child in state-
initiated proceedings or to provide greater protection of privacy to wealthier
parents?
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B. Constitutional Authority
Children clearly possess certain constitutional rights."' The
scope of these rights, however, is unclear. Professor Tribe has noted
that children's rights, like those of "discrete and insular minorities,"
are difficult to safeguard because they are not represented in the leg-
islature.112 Although there may be reasons to treat children differ-
ently from adults at times, children's rights prevail over competing
considerations when
the issue... involves the exercise of a right we have come to regard
as constitutionally 'fundamental,' such as the right to bodily liberty
or the right to be heard in one's own defense.... [W]hen such a
right is at stake, the general fact of youth alone cannot automatically
justify the right's abridgement." 1
3
Sexual molestation is an invasion of bodily liberty and integrity.
Just as a person has a right to refuse medical treatment1 14 and a right
to be free from forced sterilization," 5 each individual has the right
to be free from incestuous, sexual molestation."' A child's right to
II1 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (holding
that minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (holding that
public school students have constitutionally protected freedom of speech); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (concluding that "whatever may be their precise impact,
neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone"); Coe v.
Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695, 698 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (stating that with reference to
" 'fundamental', 'personal,' constituLtional rights," a pregnant woman under 18 years
of age could not be distinguished from one of majority age), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S.
279 (1974); Genden, supra note 14, at 581 (discussing the nature of a child's
constitutional rights).
Although the rights of children now appear to be firmly established,
constitutional protection for children is a fairly recent development. The first
Supreme Court case involving the rights of children was not heard until 1966. See
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561-62 (1966) (holding that due process entitles
a juvenile to representation by counsel).
112 See Tribe, supra note 76, at 9 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)).
113 Id. at 11.
114 See Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1542 (D.D.C.
1985); Superintendent v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977);
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914),
overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
115 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
116 It is acknowledged that ihe threat to bodily integrity is not state initiated and
that the fourteenth amendment applies only to state actors or those acting under the
color of state authority. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (stating
that only state actions are the subject matter of the fourteenth amendment). Even
when parents agree on custody, however, the court's approval of this determination
is a prerequisite to its validity. In deciding whether to approve the agreement, the
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be heard in "self-defense" is as critical a protective measure in a sex-
ual abuse case as in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. All children
who are suspected sexual abuse victims and who are the subjects of
private custody disputes have important interests which are weighty
enough to warrant explicit consideration in a constitutional analysis.
A due process argument that children in divorce custody cases
are constitutionally entitled to representation may be based on In re
Gault." 7 This landmark case established a minor's right to counsel
in juvenile delinquency proceedings which may result in commit-
ment to an institution.11 While the Court limited its decision to a
determination of a juvenile's entitlement to counsel in delinquency
proceedings, 119 the case has been the impetus for extending the
legal rights of minors.
120
Ordinarily, the requirements of procedural due process apply
only when there is a threat to life, liberty, or property, as protected
by the fourteenth amendment.' 21 Gault expressed such a strong
belief in the critical role of counsel in the Americanjudicial system,
however, that many commentators have argued that the right of
counsel in Gault is independent of the type of interest affected. They
assert that this right will eventually extend beyond those cases
involving a deprivation of liberty to all judicial proceedings involving
children.
12 2
In any case, a child has a liberty interest in remaining in her
family's custody. The Supreme Court has recognized that family
state also may be .adjudicating whether abuse will continue; that decision will be
enforceable by the state against the parties. See Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 478 F.
Supp. 434, 439 (D.N.D. 1979) (holding that enforcement of a court custody order
invoked the full powers of the District of Columbia, sufficient to meet the "federal
action" requirement, the analog of state action, of the fifth amendment), vacated on
other grounds, 623 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1980).
117 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
118 See id. at 41. The extent to which the opinion depends on the juvenile's
interest in freedom from confinement is unclear. See infra notes 121-22 and
accompanying text.
119 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 13-14.
120 See Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All that Glitters is not
Gault, 15J. FAM. L. 27, 27 (1976-77) (attributing to Gault a general "alteration of the
balance of power in child-populated, adult-dominated institutions," such as juvenile
courts, schools, and mental hospitals).
121 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
122 See, e.g., Genden, supra note 14, at 582 (discussing the extension of Gault);
Inker & Perretta, supra note 42, at 113 (stating that a dynamic system would logically
extend the protections of Gault to all proceedings involving children); Due Process,
supra note 9, at 177 (stating that Gault was the Court's recognition that children are
not best served by informal treatment in a paternalistic system).
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relationships are interests which entitle parents to due process.
12
3
The Court has also stated tlhat liberty encompasses the right to estab-
lish a home, bring up children, and to "enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness.
'' 24
Just as a parent's liberty is affected by state decisions concerning
her relationship with her child, a child's liberty is similarly affected.
Therefore, the liberty interests of both the parent and the child must
be protected by due process of law. The Second Circuit noted this
reciprocity of rights in stating:
This right to the preservation of family integrity encompasses the
reciprocal rights of both parent and children. It is the interest of
the parent in the "companionship, care, custody and management
of his ... children ... and of the children in not being dislocated
from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of
daily association," with the parents.1
25
A child's right to representation is derived from this right to contin-
ued parental contact, and its exercise guards against unnecessary dis-
ruption of parent-child relationships. In the context of state-
initiated custody proceedings, it has been recognized that: "[t]he
physical liberty interest of a child in a neglect proceeding is suffi-
ciently similar to the liberty interest of a child in a delinquency pro-
ceeding to require the same right to counsel."1 26 Similarly, it has
been noted that: "[a] change of parental bondage during the tender
years is hardly less upsetting of one's pattern of life than is the
denomination and possible commitment of a child as a 'juvenile
delinquent.' "127 While the representation of allegedly abused chil-
123 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (stating that a parent's
interest in the care, companionship, and custody of children are rights deserving of
due process); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (requiring notice and a
hearing before depriving a parent of the custody of a child).
124 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
125 Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Stanley, 405
U.S. at 651); See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) ("No one would seriously dispute that an] ...
interdependent relationship [exists] between an adult and a child in his or her care");
Smith v. Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987) ("companionship and
nurturing interests of parent and child in maintaining tight familial bond are
reciprocal"); In re S.A.D., 382 l?a. Super. 166, 175, 555 A.2d 123, 126 (1989)
(recognizing the child's interest in a dependency hearing as concomitant to the
parents' rights).
126 Long, When the Client is a Child: Dilemmas in the Lawyer's Role, 21 J. FAM. L.
607, 628 (1982-83).
127 Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1027 (5th Cir. 1969) (Rives, J.,
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dren in state-initiated proceedings is governed by statutes, it is fre-
quently argued that such a procedure is constitutionally
compelled. 2 If resting on constitutional grounds, the right ought
to extend to private proceedings as well. The child's interest in a
continuing relationship with a non-abusive parent is no less impor-
tant when another parent, rather than the state, seeks effectively to
terminate the relationship.
In all private custody disputes, cognizance of the constitution-
ally protected interest in family integrity begs the question of
whether all children have a constitutionally protected right to be free
from state interference with an ongoing parent-child relationship.
Arguably, the court has no authority to inhibit a child's relationship
with a non-custodial parent unless that relationship would cause the
child articulable harm.129 One commentator has suggested that
even when the institutionalization or foster care of a child is not con-
templated, the child's liberty is always invoked by a change in cus-
tody, because of the potential deprivation to the child of the
company and control of one parent.13 0 While a child does not nor-
mally have the liberty to choose her custodian, when a situation
arises which calls for a judicial choice, failure to consider the child's
dissenting) (asserting the importance of not denying access to the courts because of
statutory financial burdens).
128 See Inker & Perretta, supra note 42, at 116-19; Redeker, supra note 52, at 530;
Due Process, supra note 9, at 184. The Constitutional basis of a child's right to counsel
in this context is an open question in view of Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv.,
452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that the due process clause did not require the
appointment of counsel for the parent in every case in which parental rights may be
terminated). When sexual abuse is alleged in the private dispute, the termination of
visitation, as well as custody, is sought.
129 See 4 L. WARDLE, C. BLAKESLEY & J. PARKER, CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW
§ 39:12, at 91 (1988). Refusing to protect a child's relationship with either single
parent is inconsistent with expanding definitions of family. Cf. supra note 84 and
accompanying text.
130 See Due Process, supra note 9, at 180-181 & n.32 (recognizing that any change
in custody, whether the child is removed to an institution or is shifted between
parents, affects the same interests of the child and that there should be no distinction
drawn for due process purposes). The child's interest has been viewed not merely as
liberty, but as "[t]he basic human right to maintain and enjoy the relationship which
normally exists between the parents and the children." State v. Wade, 19 Or. App.
314, 319, 527 P.2d 753, 755 (1974) (affording independent counsel to children
involved in proceedings regarding the termination of parental rights), overruled on
other grounds, In re D., 24 Or. App. 601, 547 P.2d 175, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976);
see also Genden, supra note 14, at 581 (discussing the characterization of the interests
in Wade).
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voice is arguably a denial of liberty under the fourteenth
amendment. 1
3 1
When sexual abuse is alleged, however, the liberty interests
implicated are yet greater than those in general private custody dis-
putes. Because a parent-child relationship is far more imperilled
when sexual abuse is alleged, the child's liberty interest merits the
same procedural safeguards in such cases as in state-initiated pro-
ceedings. While the potential for harm is generally less in private
custody cases than in juvenile delinquency cases, this is not true of
private custody cases in which sexual abuse is alleged. All allegations
of child sexual abuse raise the need for the procedural protection of
independent counsel to represent the suspected victims.
CONCLUSION
The nation has declared war on the critical social problem of
child abuse, particularly sexual abuse. Because establishing sexual
abuse in private custody disputes is so complex and difficult, and
because the consequences of erroneous determinations are so perni-
cious, an attack on child abuse which does not include the private
forum is incomplete.
In private custody disputes, the child's dual interests in avoiding
continued molestation and in maintaining healthy relationships with
non-abusing parents merit legal recognition. Because those interests
differ from the parents' and are insufficiently protected by parens
patriae, they warrant separate legal representation.
Whether or not it is recognized as constitutionally compelled,
the present statutory and judicial commitment to making custody
determinations that are in a child's best interests mandates the
independent legal representation of all children when sexual abuse is
alleged. This will not eradicate the damage done to victims of sexual
131 See Due Process, supra note 9, at 180; see also Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012,
1027 (5th Cir. 1969) (Rives, J., dissenting) (professing that because a well-founded
parental relationship is a necessity in that the formation of life habits is at stake,
"there could hardly be a better case for Fourteenth Amendment protection"), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970); cf. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) (stating
that "whether the Constitution requires that a particular right [of due process] obtain
in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors," including the nature
of the alleged right, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on the
proceeding). Custody proceedings will have great effects on the later lives of the
children involved. In light of these effects, the flexible approach articulated in
Hannah indicates that the due process right of independent legal representation
should be provided to children in custody proceedings. See Inker & Peretta, supra
note 42, at 116-18.
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abuse; it can, however, provide a means for reducing the damage by
insuring that the victim's interests are not neglected.
"The legal profession is the one most identifiable group in con-
trol of our nation's destiny. It must lead the way in providing for the
needs of helpless children whose lives are tangled in the law."'
13 2
The independent legal representation of all children who are sus-
pected victims of sexual abuse is a vital step towards tipping the
scales ofjustice in the children's best interests.
132 Lane, supra note 11, at 177.
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